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THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO-CANADA
AGREEMENT: HOW NAFTA 2.0 REPRESENTS A
NEW ERA IN NORTH AMERICAN TRADE

I.

INTRODUCTION

In May 2017, President Trump fulfilled a key campaign promise1
when he began renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).2 Enacted in 1994, NAFTA created one of the largest
free trade zones in the world by liberalizing trade between the United
States, Canada, and Mexico.3 NAFTA inextricably integrated three
vastly different economies into a single trade bloc, resulting in many
unintended economic consequences. In an attempt to remedy some of
these consequences, the Trump administration embarked on a yearlong effort to re-negotiate the agreement, culminating in the signing of
the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA or Agreement) on November 30, 2018.4 Although the USMCA has been
dubbed “NAFTA 2.0” since it contains many key provisions from
NAFTA, the re-negotiated text introduces important substantive
changes to trade policy aimed at creating a fairer economic landscape
and preparing the trade bloc for the economic realities of the twentyfirst century.5
For many workers, industry leaders, and politicians, the USMCA is
a necessary modernization of a deeply flawed deal that created devastating unintended economic consequences and unbalanced reciprocal
trade in North America. But whether the USMCA will achieve its desired result remains uncertain. Will the USMCA, like NAFTA, result
in unintended consequences that will not come to light until decades
after its implementation?
1. Sheelah Kolhatkar, Trump’s Rebrand of NAFTA, NEW YORKER (Oct. 3, 2018), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trumps-rebrand-of-nafta (“Throughout the campaign, I
promised to renegotiate NAFTA, and today we have kept that promise.”).
2. Tori K. Whiting & Gabriella Beaumont-Smith, AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO-CANADA AGREEMENT, HERITAGE FOUND. 1 (2019),https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/
analysis-the-united-states-mexico-canada-agreement.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Dimitrios Bakas et al., NAFTA 2.0 Is a Welcome Deal for the US, Canada and Mexico in a
Time of Trade Uncertainty, LSE (Nov. 13, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2019/11/13/
nafta-2-0-is-a-welcome-deal-for-the-us-canada-and-mexico-in-a-time-of-trade-uncertainty/.
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The answer is unclear, but what is certain is that the USMCA will
present a host of new legal challenges for companies seeking to avail
themselves to the benefits of the Agreement.6 The USMCA affects all
producers, exporters, and importers of goods in North America.7 Corporations and corporate counsel will need to become familiar with its
terms and obligations in order to effectively advise their clients since
failure to comply can have devastating financial ramifications.8
Thus, this Comment is intended to provide the legal community
with a starting point for understanding these new provisions by analyzing several of the USMCA’s key changes in the context of their
practical applications and the shortcomings of NAFTA they purport
to solve. Part II will provide a background on NAFTA, its re-negotiation, and the key changes embodied in the USMCA. Part III will analyze several of the USMCA’s most drastic changes, particularly its
labor and environmental provisions, with a focus on what the Biden
administration will need to do to effectively implement their intended
changes. Finally, Part IV will look forward to the potential unforeseen
impacts of the USMCA and its influence on future trade policy.
II. BACKGROUND
A. NAFTA
“[NAFTA] means jobs. American Jobs, and good paying American
jobs. If I didn’t believe that, I wouldn’t support the agreement.”
–President Bill Clinton, 19939
NAFTA was signed into law by President Bill Clinton and came
into effect on January 1, 1994.10 The purpose of NAFTA was to boost
trade between the United States, Canada, and Mexico while modernizing Mexico’s economy.11 NAFTA was enacted in a political climate
6. Richard Mojica et al., Five Takeaways for Corporate Counsel on the USMCA, LAW.COM
(June 24, 2020), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2020/06/24/five-takeaways-for-corporatecounsel-on-the-usmca/?slreturn=20201022191529.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Janna Herron, Was NAFTA Really So Bad for the Economy?, FISCAL TIMES (Sept. 28,
2016), https://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2016/09/28/Was-NAFTA-Really-So-Bad-Economy.
10. HISTORY.COM, This Day in History: December 08 1993 NAFTA Signed Into Law (Mar. 4,
2010), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/nafta-signed-into-law.
11. David Floyd, NAFTA’s Winners and Losers, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 11, 2022), https://
www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/north-american-free-trade-agreement.asp;
Andrew Chatzky et al., NAFTA and the USMCA: Weighing the Impact of North American Trade,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (July 1, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftas-eco
nomic-impact (Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari saw NAFTA as an opportunity to
modernize the Mexican economy.).
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dominated by a neoliberal12 economic ideology advocating for the
elimination of trade barriers to simplify the flow of commodities and
capital financing around the world and foster global competition.13
Thus, NAFTA was initially hailed as a massive victory by proponents of free trade as the agreement created a trilateral trade bloc that
eliminated tariffs between the three largest North American markets.14 However, President Clinton’s remarks would eventually come
back to haunt him, as free trade between the three countries opened a
pandora’s box of unforeseen economic issues.
The first of these unintended consequences came about in the manufacturing sector. As massive American multinational corporations
gained access to Mexican markets and labor, they began to invest
heavily in moving their manufacturing operations to Mexico.15 In
NAFTA’s first ten years, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico rose from $15 billion to more than $107.8 billion.16 Companies began to concentrate manufacturing operations along Mexico’s northern
border with the United States in areas known as “maquiladoras.”17
Maquiladoras are specialized industrial zones in Mexico that import
raw materials from the United States, convert them into goods, and
then export those finished products back to the United States for sale
and consumption.18 These specialized trade zones offer geographically
convenient locations for manufacturers to take advantage of free
trade, lower wages, and relaxed labor regulations to cut manufacturing costs.19 The resulting shift in production to Mexico caused an estimated loss of over 900,000 U.S. jobs, the closing of around 80,000 U.S.
12. Will Kenton, Neoliberalism, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/n/neoliberalism.asp. Neoliberalism refers to market-oriented reform policies such as the
elimination of price controls, deregulation of capital markets, lowering of trade barriers, and
reducing state-influence in the economy. Id.
13. Pablo Ruiz Nápoles, Neoliberal Reforms and NAFTA in Mexico, 14 ECONOMÍA UNAM
75, 75 (2017), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1665952X17300191 (NAFTA
was a neoliberal reform of “prime political importance.”).
14. Chatzky et al., supra note 11. (“NAFTA eliminated most tariffs on products traded between [the United States, Mexico, and Canada], with a major focus on liberalizing trade . . . .”).
15. See Herron, supra note 9.
16. Mauro Guillén, NAFTA’s Impact on the U.S. Economy: What Are the Facts?, KNOWLEDGE WHARTON (Sept. 6, 2016), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/naftas-impact-u-seconomy-facts/.
17. William C. Gruben, Did NAFTA Really Cause Mexico’s High Maquiladora Growth? (Ctr.
for Latin Am. Econs., Working Paper No. CLAE 0301, 2001), https://www.dallasfed.org/~/me
dia/documents/research/papers/2001/wp0106.pdf.
18. Id.
19. JESUS CAÑAS & ROBERT W. GILMER, THE MAQUILADORAS CHANGING GEOGRAPHY,
FED. RESERVE BANK DALL. 12–14 (2009), https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/research/swe/2009/swe0902c.pdf.
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factories, and imbalanced trade between the United States and
Mexico.20
On the other hand, NAFTA bolstered U.S. agricultural trade.
NAFTA required Mexico to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers
on agricultural products in order to accommodate U.S. agri-business.21
As a result, U.S. agriculture, which is one of the most heavily subsidized and mechanized industries in the world, was able to dominate
the Mexican corn market by exporting surplus product into Mexican
markets at nineteen percent below the cost of production between
1997 and 2005.22 The consequences to the Mexican agricultural industry were devastating, as it was unable to compete with American production and pricing.23 “Ejido”24 farmers, who were already some of
the poorest and most underrepresented people in Mexican society,
saw their monthly wages decrease from 1,959 pesos to just 228 pesos
in a little over ten years.25 It is estimated that over 1.3 million ejido
20. PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA’s Legacy: Lost Jobs, Lower Wages, Increased Inequality(Feb.
2018), https://www.citizen.org/wpcontent/uploads/nafta_factsheet_deficit_jobs_wages_feb_2018_
final.pdf. In 1993 (the year before NAFTA took effect), the United States had a goods and
services surplus of $7.5 billion with Mexico. Id. In 2017, the United States had a $119.4 billion
good and services deficit with Mexico, consisting of a $126.4 billion goods deficit and a $7 billion
services surplus. Id. The effect of this shift in production was enormous. The U.S. Labor Department certified that more than 950,000 U.S. jobs were lost because of NAFTA outsourcing. Id.
This figure does not consider many categories of workers that lost their jobs during NAFTA’s
first ten years. Id. In NAFTA’s first ten years, the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) estimates that
the United States’s’s trade deficit with Mexico and Canada eliminated one million net jobs, onethird of which were due to NAFTA. Id. This is supported by data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, which shows that between 1993 and 2017, nearly 4.5 million U.S. manufacturing jobs
were lost and that one out of every four of those losses could be attributed to NAFTA. Id.
Similarly, a report by the Liberal Economic Policy Institute found that from 1993 to 2013,
851,700 U.S. jobs were displaced because of the United States’s rising post-NAFTA trade deficit
with Mexico and Canada. Id. In terms of factory losses, the EPI found that 80,000 manufacturing
establishments in the United States were closed from 1994 through 2014. Id. This determination
is based on data from the Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics, which found that there
were 357,330 manufacturing establishments in the United States in 1994, and just 274,765 in
2014. Id.
21. See Rick Relinger, NAFTA and U.S. Corn Subsidies: Explaining the Displacement of Mexico’s Corn Farmers, PROSPECT (Apr. 19, 2010), https://prospect-journal.org/2010/04/19/nafta-andu-s-corn-subsidies-explaining-the-displacement-of-mexicos-corn-farmers/.
22. Timothy A. Wise, Agricultural Dumping Under NAFTA: Estimating the Costs of U.S. Agricultural Policies to Mexican Producers 13, 17 (Glob. Dev. & Env’t Inst., Working Paper No. 0908, Dec. 2009), https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/179078/.
23. Megan Janetsky, Mexicans Work To Reclaim Corn As Their Own, CRONKITE NEWS (Oct.
12, 2017), https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/buffett/mexico/corn/.
24. MEXLAW, The Ejido, A Mexican Concept Misunderstood by Foreigners (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://mexlaw.com/ejido-mexican-concept-misunderstood-foreigners/ (“An Ejido is an area of
communal land mainly used for agriculture, on which community members farm designated
plots and collectively maintain communal holdings.”).
25. MARCELINE WHITE ET AL., WOMEN’S EDGE COALITION, NAFTA AND THE FTAA: A
GENDER ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY IMPACTS IN AGRICULTURE iii, 5–6 (2003),
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farmers became unemployed as a result.26 This massive increase in
unemployment is cited as one the major factors for the increase in
migration and illegal immigrants entering the United States in the
2000s, as impoverished farmers had little choice but to seek work in
the newly created “maquiladoras” or seasonal work on U.S. farms.27
B. Calls for Reform
“The single worst trade deal ever approved in this country.”
–Donald Trump28
With the election of President Donald Trump, the neoliberal economic policies of the 1990s and 2000s began to give way to an
“America First” trade ideology that promised to limit globalization
and revitalize protectionist tariffs in order to shield domestic industry
from foreign competition.29 As president, Donald Trump began to
pursue an aggressive renegotiation of trade deals in order to level the
playing field for domestic manufacturing.30 This included a commitment to “tear up NAFTA” in order to re-negotiate and replace it with
a deal that sought to balance the United States’s trade deficit.31 The
result was a year-long renegotiation process that culminated in the
ratification of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement on July 1,
2020.32

https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/NAFTA_and_the_FTAA_A_Gender_Analysis_of_Em
ploy.pdf.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Herron, supra note 9.
29. Julia Howald et al., Farewell to “America First”? Trade Policy Under Joe Biden, BDI
(June 6, 2021), https://english.bdi.eu/article/news/america-first-u-s-trade-policy-under-presidentdonald-trump/.
30. Jen Kirby, Trump Has Threatened To Withdraw from NAFTA. What’s Next?, VOX (Dec.
4, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/12/4/18123809/usmca-trump-nafta-withdrawal-congress.
31. See id.
32. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(last visited Apr. 22, 2022), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/unitedstates-mexico-canada-agreement.
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C. USMCA
“[A] victory for American workers.”
–Nancy Pelosi33
The USMCA is not really a new trade agreement since it retains
many of NAFTA’s key provisions.34 Instead, it modifies NAFTA by
revising, adding, and eliminating several provisions. The Agreement
has received wide bi-partisan support, being characterized as “better
than NAFTA” and “a victory for American workers” by Nancy
Pelosi.35 The USMCA preserves the United States’s competitive advantage in many areas, such as the digital economy, patents, and financial services, while simultaneously leveling the playing field for
companies manufacturing products in the United States.36 The initial
version of the deal was estimated to create more than 176,000 U.S.
jobs and increase GDP by up to 0.35% during its first six years.37
The text of the USMCA contains thirty-four chapters, four separate
annexes, and thirteen side-letters.38 The USMCA mirrors several key
provisions of NAFTA such as those relating to state-to-state dispute
resolution and U.S. aluminum and steel tariffs on Canada and Mexico
(along with retaliatory Canadian tariffs).39 Notably, the USMCA has
33. Stephen Loiaconi, Dems Claim ‘Victory for America’s Workers’ as They Announce Support For Trump’s USMCA, ABC 6 (Dec. 10, 2019), https://abc6onyourside.com/news/nationworld/dems-claim-victory-for-americas-workers-as-they-announce-support-for-trumps-usmca.
34. M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO-CANADA AGREEMENT Summary Page (2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R44981.pdf (“USMCA . . .
retains most of NAFTA’s market opening measures and others measures, while making notable
changes to motor vehicle rules of origin, dispute settlement provisions, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property protection. It also modernizes provisions on services,
labor, and the environment.”).
35. Loiaconi, supra note 33.
36. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, United-States-Mexico-Canada Trade Fact
Sheet: Modernizing NAFTA into a 21st Century Trade Agreement, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/fact-sheets/modernizing
(last visited Apr. 22, 2022) [hereinafter Modernizing NAFTA]; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Fact Sheet: Rebalancing Trade to Support
Manufacturing, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexicocanada-agreement/fact-sheets/rebalancing (last visited Apr. 22, 2022) [hereinafter Rebalancing
Trade].
37. Robert E. Scott, Meet the New NAFTA – Same as the Old NAFTA, THE HILL (Apr. 29,
2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/441057-meet-the-new-nafta-same-as-the-old-nafta.
38. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Agreement Between the United States of
American, the United Mexican States, and Canada 7/1/20 Text, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between (last visited
Apr. 22, 2022).
39. Id.
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eliminated investor-state dispute settlements between the United
States and Mexico.40
Where the new agreement substantially differs from NAFTA is in
rules for manufacturing. The USMCA’s labor provisions require collective bargaining and secret union voting in order to reduce the influence of powerful Mexican business owners and improve labor
conditions in Mexican manufacturing plants.41 The USMCA contains
key enforcement procedures that allow U.S. labor inspectors to visit
Mexican facilities to ensure compliance, gives the U.S. government
power to deny preferential tariffs for goods purchased by Mexican
companies that do not meet agreed upon labor standards, and provides for an interagency committee that will monitor Mexico’s labor
reform implementations and compliance with labor obligations.42 It
even provides for a “Rapid Response Panel” to review whether specific facilities are violating workers’ rights and to levy duties against
rule breakers.43 Further, the USMCA contains anti-discrimination
provisions that seek to eliminate workplace discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity.44
The USMCA was even supported by the American Automotive
Policy Counsel, an organization representing the Big Three automotive manufacturers in the United States.45 The new agreement modified several key provisions of NAFTA relating to automobile
manufacturing. First, the rules of origin for automobiles were modified so that seventy-five percent of every automobile must be made in
North America in order to qualify for duty-free treatment.46 Further,
40. Id. NAFTA’s Chapter 11 provided for an investor-state dispute mechanism. Id.
41. U.S.M.C.A. art. 23.3(1)(a), Nov. 30, 2018 (“Each Party shall adopt and maintain . . . freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining”); see also
id. at annex 23-A, Worker Representation in Collective Bargaining in Mexico (sets out Mexico’s
obligations with regard to worker representation and collective bargaining and explains that
“Mexico shall . . . [p]rovide in its labor laws . . . for an effective system to verify that elections of
union leaders are carried out through a personal, free, and secret vote of union members”).
42. Id.
43. KING & SPALDING, Companies Face Risk from the USMCA’s New Rapid Response Mechanism To Enforce Labor Rights (July 15, 2020), https://www.kslaw.com/news-and-insights/companies-face-risk-from-the-usmcas-new-rapid-response-mechanism-to-enforce-labor-rights.
44. Alex Reed, NAFTA 2.0 and LGBTQ Employment Discrimination, 57 AM. BUS. L.J. 5, 11
(2020).
45. Press Release, American Automotive Policy Council, AAPC Statement of Signing of
USMCA (Nov. 30, 2018), http://www.americanautocouncil.org/content/aapc-statement-signingusmca.
46. WILLIAM ALAN REINSCH, ET AL., THE IMPACT OF RULES OF ORIGIN ON SUPPLY CHAINS,
CSIS 19 (2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/impact-rules-origin-supply-chains-usmcas-autorules-case-study. The USMCA requires a seventy-five percent Regional Value Content (RVC)
for light vehicles and light trucks and a seventy percent RVC threshold for heavy trucks. Id. Core
parts, including “engines, chassis, gearboxes (transmissions), shocks, steering boxes, and ad-
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forty to forty-five percent of automobile parts manufactured for vehicles receiving duty-free treatment must originate in factories that pay
workers at least $16 an hour.47 Collectively, these provisions were
aimed at raising wages and the cost of manufacturing in Mexico, while
allowing the industry to remain globally competitive by ensuring that
vehicle and auto parts are allowed to move freely.48 As a result of the
USMCA, General Motors shifted production plans for a new Chevrolet electric vehicle back to the United States and is now building a new
manufacturing plant in Ohio.49
In the agricultural sector, the USMCA retains many of NAFTA’s
original advantages for U.S. agribusiness. NAFTA originally eliminated almost all tariffs on agricultural products.50 The USMCA retains this free rate of duty, however, it will further open Canadian
markets to U.S. dairy producers by requiring Canada to set new quotas which are expected to grant U.S. dairy farmers access to up to 3.6
percent of Canada’s dairy market.51
Moreover, the USMCA enforces additional protections for intellectual property rights. The Agreement supports ten years of data protection for biological drugs and promulgates standards protecting
against the infringement of digital works.52 These provisions bar Cavanced batteries for electric cars” must meet a seventy-five percent RVC threshold. Id. Core
parts are typically manufactured by higher-skilled workers. Id.
47. The USMCA’s contains a new labor value content requirement:
The USMCA introduces a phased-in labor value content (LVC) requirement, that requires 40-45 percent of the content of an automobile be made by workers earning at
least $16 per hour. The 40-45 percent range is dependent on the type of vehicle; passenger vehicles require 40 percent, whereas pickup trucks require 45 percent.
Id. at 21.
48. WQAD, 5 Key Difference Between NAFTA and Trump’s USMCA Deal (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.wqad.com/article/news/5-key-differences-between-nafta-and-trumps-usmca-deal/
526-2d592d7f-11b7-4127-8b00-1ed633b9cc6e.
49. Dan Flores & Jim Cain, GM Announces News Manufacturing Jobs Coming to Ohio, GEN.
MOTORS (Aug. 5, 2019), https://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/home.detail.html/content/Pages/
news/us/en/2019/may/0508-ohio.html.
50. Sebastian Pouliot, The Importance of NAFTA for the Agricultural Sector, IOWA ST.
AGRIC. POL’Y REV., https://www.card.iastate.edu/ag_policy_review/article/?a=73 (last visited
Apr. 24, 2022).
51. Katie Lobosco, Canada Opened its Dairy Market. But by How Much?, CNN (Oct. 2,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/02/politics/usmca-canada-dairy/index.html; see also OFFICE
OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Fact Sheet Agriculture: Market Access and Dairy Outcomes of the USMC Agreement, https://ustr.gov/trade-agree
ments/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/fact-sheets/market-accessand-dairy-outcomes (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
52. U.S.M.C.A. art. 19; see also Nicole Corey, USMCA Trade Agreement Includes Minimum
10-Year Data Exclusivity for Biologics, GOODWIN (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.bigmoleculewatch.
com/2018/10/05/usmca-trade-agreement-includes-minimum-10-year-data-exclusivity-for-biolog
ics/; Modernizing NAFTA, supra note 36.
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nada and Mexico from forcing U.S. companies to store their data on
their own servers.53 They also immunize U.S. companies from lawsuits
in Canada or Mexico for content appearing on their internet
platforms.54
Additionally, the USMCA adds special provisions dealing with
“non-market” countries.55 USMCA members are required to notify
each other if they intend to negotiate with non-market countries.56
These provisions allow for the Agreement to be unilaterally terminated if any country enters into a free trade agreement with a nonmarket country.57 This limitation, of course, is seen as a direct attack
on China, which has been increasingly active in the past decade in
international trade affairs and is seen as a competitor to U.S. economic interests.58
Finally, the USMCA allocates USD $300 million to address environmental problems and makes regulations easier to enforce by eliminating NAFTA’s requirement that a plaintiff must prove a violation
“affect[s] trade” before they are allowed to pursue relief.59 Despite
these measures, many have criticized the USMCA for not going far
enough to protect the environment and for not directly dealing with
issues of climate change.60 Notably, the Sierra Club61 refused to support the USMCA, claiming that its so-called “environmental protections” fail to remedy NAFTA’s threats to “wildlife, clean air and
53. Art. 19.12 (“No Party shall require a covered person to use or locate computing facilities
in that Party’s territory as a condition for conducting business in that territory.”); see also id. at
art. 19.1 (defining computing facility as “a computer server or storage device for processing or
storing information for commercial use”).
54. See id. at Art 19.
55. Simon Lester et al., The Canada-China FTA in Peril Part 1: The USSMCA “Non-Market
Country” Provision, GEO. J. INT’L AFFS. (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.georgetownjournalofinter
nationalaffairs.org/online-edition/2019/2/28/the-canada-china-fta-in-peril-part-1-the-usmca-nonmarket-country-provision.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Press Release, Diane Feinstein, Statement on USMCA Trade Agreement (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=A117BA0D-470A-45AC9688-3794EF627557; CONG. RES. SERV., USMCA: AMENDMENT AND KEY CHANGES (Jan. 30,
2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11391 (“The revised text [of the
USMCA] asserts the presumption that an environmental dispute affects trade and investment
unless a respondent party can prove otherwise.”).
60. Id.
61. SIERRA CLUB, Mission Statement, https://www.sierraclub.org/about-sierra-club (last visited
Apr. 24, 2022). The Sierra Club is a grassroots environmental organization in the United States
dedicated to protecting the environment, promoting the responsible use of resources and ecosystems, and educating humanity on protecting and restoring the natural environment. Id.
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water, or the health of . . . communities.”62 Despite the USMCA’s bipartisan support, environmental regulation has been a particularly
contentious issue with the Agreement and was noted as the primary
reason for its lack of support among progressives.63
D. Looking Forward
Officials have touted the new USMCA as a major victory for proponents of fair trade. Former United States Trade Representative
(USTR) Robert Lightizer claimed the new Agreement’s stronger
rules for automobiles, greater access for farmers, and unprecedented
labor standards are meant to honor notions of fairness by leveling the
playing field for American workers and bringing billions of dollars’
worth of manufacturing back to the United States.64 The USTR Secretary’s office claims the USMCA’s provisions regarding digital trade
will protect the United States’s competitive advantage in intellectual
property and financial services and will provide for much needed discipline of state-owned enterprises and currency manipulators by limiting relationships with non-market countries.65 These measures were
advocated as necessary to spur what many see as unfair trade practices
by China.66 The USMCA’s termination provision, which sets a definite
period of sixteen years and mandatory review every six years, is purported to ensure that the USMCA, unlike NAFTA, will not become
unbalanced or out of date.67

62. SIERRA CLUB, Trump’s NAFTA Deal Threatens Our Air, Water, and Climate, https://
www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/NAFTA-environment-statement.pdf (last visited May 1, 2022).
63. William Alan Reinsch & Madeleine Waddoups, The Road to Ratification: Democrats’ Resistance to the USMCA, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (May 16, 2019), https://
www.csis.org/analysis/road-ratification-democrats-resistance-usmca.
64. Robert Lighthizer, USMCA, Replacing NAFTA Today, Is the Model for All Future Trade
Agreements, TRIB LIVE (July. 1, 2020), https://triblive.com/opinion/robert-lighthizer-usmca-replacing-nafta-today-is-the-model-for-all-future-trade-agreements/.
65. See Modernizing NAFTA, supra note 36.
66. James Bacchus et al., Disciplining China’s Trade Practices at the WTO: How WTO Complaints Can Help Make China More Market-Oriented, CATO INST. (Nov. 15, 2018), https://
www.cato.org/policy-analysis/disciplining-chinas-trade-practices-wto-how-wto-complaints-canhelp-make-china-more#introduction. China’s trade practices have come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. China discriminates against foreign products and companies by forcing foreign companies to relinquish their intellectual property to gain market access. Id. China also
imposes artificially high tariffs and domestic content requirements on imports. Id.
67. Id.; U.S.M.C.A. art. 34.7.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. New Administration
The Trump administration took much credit for fostering a national
economy that prospered due to deregulation, lower taxes, energy independence, and trade deals that put American workers first.68 The
USMCA was meant to embody this commitment by leveling the playing field for domestic manufacturing and improving the plight of
American middle-class workers.69 However, with the election of President Joe Biden, many began to question the new administration’s
commitment to pursuing the implementation and enforcement of the
USMCA’s agenda.70 President Biden, a supporter of both the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) and NAFTA, is undoubtedly a champion of
free trade and foreign direct investment.71 His trade policy may be
viewed as a return to the neoliberal policies of the Clinton and Obama
administrations that further opened the United States to the fruits and
consequences of globalization. Although President Biden is seen by
many as economically moderate, critics have questioned the influence
of the left-wing progressive faction of the Democratic party on his
policymaking and the practical effects that compromise with a more
progressive agenda will have on a trade policy promulgated under a
conservative administration.72
However, any fears that the Biden administration would throw-out
or re-write key provisions of the USMCA seem to have calmed. In
fact, President Biden has nominated individuals who were instrumental to the USMCA’s enactment to the United States Trade Representative’s office.73 Katherine Tai, the chief trade lawyer for the
USMCA’s labor provisions, is the new United States Trade Representative, replacing Robert Lighthizer.74 Additionally, Nora Todd, a top
senate aid in the negotiation of the USMCA, was selected for the role
68. See Michael Taube, Cancellation of the Keystone XL Pipeline Starts Biden and Canada on
the Wrong Foot, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/
21/keystone-pipeline-biden-canada-trudeau-wrong-foot/.
69. Rebalancing Trade, supra note 36.
70. See, e.g., Tyne Morgan, Biden’s Trade Team is Stacked with USMCA Linchpins, AG WEB
(Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.agweb.com/news/policy/politics/bidens-trade-team-stacked-usmcalinchpins.
71. Yen Nee Lee, Biden Would Want the U.S. to Rejoin Trans-Pacific Partnership, Leading
China Watcher Says, CNBC (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/04/biden-would-wantthe-us-to-rejoin-tpp-says-harvard-scholar.html.
72. Ana Swanson, Biden Appointments Signal a Trade Approach that Hews to the Left, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/08/business/economy/biden-trade.html.
73. Morgan, supra note 70.
74. Id.
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of chief of staff.75 These appointments signal that the Biden administration will put forth a full effort to protect and implement the essence
of the new agreement.76 Thus, in order to effectively manage their
operations and supply chains, North American corporations will not
only need to understand the key provisions of the USMCA, but also
predict the approach the Biden administration will take in their implementation. The following sections are meant to outline some of those
key provisions and how implementation has and will likely play out in
the next four years.
As President Trump called for the narrowing of the trade deficit
with Mexico, the auto industry became a major area of focus given
that it accounts for the greatest imbalance in reciprocal trade between
the United States and Mexico.77 In order to combat this imbalance
and bring automotive manufacturing jobs back to the United States,
the USMCA introduces new manufacturing rules of origin.78 Chapter
4 of the USMCA requires seventy-five percent of manufactured parts
for vehicles to originate in North America in order to qualify for dutyfree treatment within the trilateral trade bloc, up from a 62.2 percent
threshold under NAFTA.79 Additionally, it imposes a requirement
that seventy percent of steel and aluminum used in vehicle production
be sourced from North America, a move that has drawn praise from
the Canadian Steel Producers Association.80 Further, the Motor &
Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA) recently lobbied
Congress to reinstate legislation giving North American vehicle part
suppliers the right to a refund of merchandise processing fees under
75. Id.
76. See HAGSTROM REP., Tai Pledges to Enforce USMCA, Be Tough with China (Feb. 26,
2021), https://www.thefencepost.com/news/tai-pledges-to-enforce-usmca-be-tough-with-china/
(“Katherine Tai . . . promised . . . that she would push Canada and Mexico to comply with the
U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement on trade and urge Canada to meet its obligations under the
phase one trade agreement.”).
77. Jose Grajeda, The United States’ Trade Deficit with Mexico, TECMA (2017), https://
www.tecma.com/trade-deficit-with-mexico/.
78. Id.
79. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Fact Sheet
Automobiles and Automotive Parts, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/fs/USMCA/
USMCA-Autos_and_Auto_Parts.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022) (The USMCA “[e]levates Regional Value Content (RVC) requirements . . . establishes an RVC of 75 percent (vs. 62.5 percent
in NAFTA), with similarly high content thresholds for core, principal, and complimentary
parts.”).
80. Id.; Press Release, Canadian Steel Producers Association, Statement on the CanadaUnited States-Mexico Agreement (July 1, 2020), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/
2020/07/01/2056071/0/en/Statement-by-the-Canadian-Steel-Producers-Association-on-the-Canada-United-States-Mexico-Agreement.html.
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the USMCA.81 Lastly, the Agreement calls for increased trade remedies such as anti-dumping and the use of Section 201,82 232,83 and
30184 tariffs.85 These changes are meant to benefit the bottom line of
U.S. manufacturers, lowering the costs of domestic manufacturing and
making them less dependent on outsourcing.
From a practical standpoint, the changes will be difficult to implement for U.S. manufacturers. Rules of origin are regulatory barriers
and require businesses to spend vast amounts of money and time to
update their production processes and supply chains. In fact, the Mexican government recently granted approval for North American car
manufacturers to delay implementation of the reforms in order to allow for more time to develop effective implementation strategies.86 To
deal with these implementation problems, the USMCA allows
automakers to request permission to implement “alternative staging
regimes” that extend the deadline for compliance up to five years.87 In
this regard, trade lawyers will be vital in interpreting the USMCA’s
various rules and in developing effective compliance plans.88
However, the effects that these new rules of origin will have on U.S.
job growth are far from certain. Although the increased regional value
81. WORLD TRADE ONLINE, MEMA Lauds USMCA Merchandise Processing Fee Correction,
(Dec. 22, 2020), https://insidetrade.com/trade/mema-lauds-usmca-merchandise-processing-feecorrection.
82. CONG. RES. SERV., Trump Administration Tariff Actions, Frequently Asked Questions
(Dec. 15, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45529.pdf (“Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 —
Allows the President to impose temporary duties and other trade measures if the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines a surge in imports is a substantial cause or threat of
serious injury to a U.S. industry.”).
83. Id. (“Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 – Allows the President to adjust
imports if the Department of Commerce finds certain products are imported in such quantities
or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair U.S. national security.”).
84. Id. (“Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 – Allows the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to suspend trade agreement concessions or impose import restrictions if it determines a U.S. trading partner is violating trade agreement commitments or engaging in
discriminatory or unreasonable practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.”).
85. David R. Hamill et al., Hot-Button Trade Issue in 2021, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 22, 2021), https://
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=159abd76-05a3-4b80-be7d-ece43431b9a0.
86. REUTERS, Mexico Backs Request by Auto Firms for More Time to Meet USMCA Rules
(Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-trade-autos-idUSKBN29R2O7.
87. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Procedures for the Submission of Petitions
by North American Producers of Passenger Vehicles or Light Trucks To Use the Alternative Staging Regime for the USMCA Rules of Origin for Automotive Goods (Apr. 21, 2020), https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/04/21/2020-08405/procedures-for-the-submission-ofpetitions-by-north-american-producers-of-passenger-vehicles-or.
88. THOMPSON HINE, Leading USMCA & Canada-U.S. Lawyer Daniel Ujczo Joins Thompson
Hine’s International Trade Practice in Columbus (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.thompsonhine.com/
news/leading-usmca-canada-us-lawyer-daniel-ujczo-joins-thompson-hines-international-tradepractice-in-columbus.
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content89 threshold will make it more difficult for semifinished products from Asia to qualify for duty-free treatment by moving through
Mexico into the United States, it is unlikely that the rules will cause
U.S. manufacturers to change where their vehicles are made.90 Since
the adoption of NAFTA, U.S. manufacturers have invested billions in
fine-tuning their production processes for maximum profitability.91
Although manufacturers will certainly want to qualify for the dutyfree treatment, the new content requirements under the USMCA do
not dictate that a certain percentage of parts originate in the United
States, only that they come from a USMCA country.92 Thus, most
auto-assembly plants that operated under NAFTA are already close to
the seventy-five percent target contemplated under the USMCA and
it is unlikely that the new quotas will result in a major shift in where
companies manufacture automotive products since the cost of uprooting manufacturing operations will simply be too great.93
However, where the USMCA will present the biggest change to the
bottom line of North American companies and the greatest opportunity to bring manufacturing jobs back to the United States will come
from labor reform. NAFTA allowed many large U.S. manufacturers to
take advantage of cheap Mexican labor in nearby “maquiladoras” in
89. See generally U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, USMCA Fact Sheet: Regional Value
Content, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2020-Jun/%2315_Regional%20
Value%20Content_USMCA%20Informational%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 24.
2022) (referencing U.S.M.C.A. art. 4.5). For the majority of goods, the USMCA provides two
RVC methods: (1) the transaction value method and (2) the net cost method. Id. Under the
transactional value method, RVC = (TV (transaction value of the good, adjusted to exclude any
costs incurred in the international shipment of the goods) – VNM (the value of the non-originating materials including materials of undetermined origin used by the producer in the production
of the goods.)/TV x 100). Id. Under the Net Cost Method, RVC = (NC (cost of the good)-VNM
(value of the non-originating materials of undetermined origin used by the producer in the production of the good.)/NC x 100). Id. Under the USMCA there is no change in the calculation
method, however, the importer may now also calculate RVC, not only the producer or exporter,
as under NAFTA. Id. The RVC threshold for non-textile goods (not including auto and auto
parts) is equal or less than sixty percent if the transaction value method is used and is equal or
less than fifty percent if the net cost method is used, with an exception under Chapter 61-63. Id.
However, the USMCA specifies that the automotive sector must use net cost method for passenger vehicles, light trucks, and heavy trucks. Id. Additionally, under the USMCA, where nonoriginating material is used in the production of a good, both (1) the value of processing of nonoriginating materials undertaken in the territory of one of more of the Parties; and (2) the value
of any originating material used in the production of the non-originating material undertaken in
the territory of one or more of the Parties, may be counted as originating content for the purposes of calculating RVC (under either method). Id.
90. DICKINSON WRIGHT, Dan Ujczo Quoted by Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics
(Aug. 2020), https://www.dickinson-wright.com/news-alerts/ujczo-scce.
91. Nicole Aschoff, The New NAFTA Is a Raw Deal for Workers, JACOBIN (Dec. 14, 2019),
https://jacobinmag.com/2019/12/nafta-deal-usmca-united-states-mexico-canada-agreement
92. Id.
93. Id.
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order to reduce costs.94 Under Chapter 23 of the USMCA, these manufacturers will have to deal with a complex new labor scheme aimed
at overhauling Mexico’s labor laws and bringing labor costs on par
with U.S. manufacturing.95 The reforms mandate a minimum standard
for working conditions and require that parts originate in factories
paying production workers at least $16 per hour.96 These provisions
are highly significant, given that the average Mexican auto worker’s
wage is around $3 an hour.97 Additionally, Mexican labor reform
under the USMCA is meant to encourage unionization similar to the
current U.S. system, and its terms are expressly laid out as “critical” to
the Agreement.98 The seven major manufacturing sectors the Agreement has targeted for compliance are auto assembly, auto parts, aerospace, industrial bakeries, electronics, mining, and steel and
aluminum.99
The labor reforms will eliminate Mexican employers’ reliance on
so-called “protection contracts,” which are contracts between employers and employer-sponsored unions that have been used to provide
favorable terms to powerful employers at the expense of Mexican
workers’ rights.100 Protection contracts are essentially “fake collective
bargaining agreements made by unions that are completely company
controlled, without the input of workers.”101 They lock in low wages
and poor working conditions and are estimated to make up as much as
seventy-five percent of collective bargaining agreements in Mexico.102
94. WHITE ET AL., supra note 25.
95. U.S.M.C.A. art. 23.
96. Ana Swanson & Jim Tankersley, Trump Just Signed the U.S.M.C.A. Here’s What’s in the
New NAFTA, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/business/econo
my/usmca-deal.html.
97. Daniel Dale, NAFTA Talks Focus on Low Wages for Mexican Autoworkers, THE STAR
(May 11, 2018), https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2018/05/11/nafta-talks-focus-on-low-wagesfor-mexican-autoworkers.html.
98. NAT’L L. REV., Pressures on U.S. Manufacturers with Mexico Operations, Supply Chains to
Comply with New Labor Laws (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/pressuresus-manufacturers-mexico-operations-supply-chains-to-comply-new-labor-laws (Mexico’s labor
law reforms “overhauled the country’s labor laws to encourage meaningful unionization similar
to what the United States has maintained for nearly 80 years. . . . [T]he reforms are an expressed
(and critical) term in the USMCA.”).
99. John L. Sander & James P. Verdi, Pressures on U.S. Manufacturers with Mexico Operations, Supply Chains to Comply with New Labor Laws, JACKSON LEWIS (Jan. 20, 2021), https://
www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/pressures-us-manufacturers-mexico-operations-supplychains-comply-new-labor-laws.
100. Id.
101. Ana Swanson, Panel Finds “Serious Concerns” With Mexican Labor Reforms, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/business/economy/usmca-mexico-la
bor-reforms.html.
102. Id.
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Mexican workers who have challenged the system of protection contracts have faced “harassment, arrest and violence.”103 For example,
Mexican labor activist Susana Prieto Terrazas was arrested for trying
to organize workers in the state of Tamaulipas as recently as June
2020, right before the USMCA took effect.104
Importantly, what makes these labor reforms truly revolutionary is
that they are not empty promises, but instead are backed by complex
enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. Although Mexico’s
federal labor law sets forth a four-year schedule to implement the reforms, the United States is seeking a much faster enforcement schedule, for which the USMCA provides unprecedented mechanisms to
meet.105 The Agreement includes a mandatory dispute resolution procedure to address nationwide compliance, a facility-specific rapid response arbitration mechanism that authorizes the United States to
take action against Mexican manufacturing facilities for denying
workers the right to free association or collective bargaining, and federal regulations granting any individual the right to file a complaint to
an Interagency Labor Committee co-chaired by the USTR and Secretary of Labor to initiate an investigation.106 If the Interagency Labor
Committee determines a violation, the USTR can file a complaint
under the USMCA, and the United States can temporarily suspend a
Mexican facility’s favorable tariff rates authorized under the
USMCA.107 In fact, the American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) has already announced its intention to file a complaint with the Labor Committee.108
Additionally, the U.S. Congress has established a bipartisan Independent Mexico Labor Expert Board (IMLE Board) to monitor and
evaluate the implementation of the reforms.109 The IMLE Board has
already issued its first mandatory report (Report) on the progress of
Mexico’s labor law reform, which criticized Mexico for missing critical
deadlines and underestimating the costs of implementation.110 The
USMCA requires federal and local consolidation centers and labor
courts to enforce reforms, which the Report states have been significantly delayed.111 The Report issued a stark warning, stating that
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Sander & Verdi, supra note 99.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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“[u]nless significant additional resources are devoted to supporting
workers to exercise these rights, the historic opportunity presented by
the Mexican labor reform is unlikely to achieve its goals.”112 Unfortunately, most union workers are still unable to “democratically elect
their leaders” and “the old system of protection contracts remains
[largely] intact.”113 Workers challenging these conditions continue to
be fired, jailed, or even killed.114
The fact of the matter is that Mexico will need to allocate a significant amount of additional funds for more federal labor inspectors and
administrative personnel if its reform program is to be successful. Additionally, greater cooperation between unions in the United States
and Mexico, and even increased federal funding from the United
States, may be necessary if these goals are to be realistically attained.
The Biden administration has promised to uphold its commitment to
the enforcement of workers’ rights.115 However, sometimes it is necessary to put your money where your mouth is. Although some have
criticized the enforcement role of the United States as an invasion of
Mexican sovereignty, increased U.S. involvement and funding will almost certainly be needed to implement these truly revolutionary reforms. Just as the United States struggled through its own period of
organizing labor in the beginning of the twentieth century, without
U.S. involvement, these changes would likely continue to come to fruition only through strife and conflict. Any sacrifice to Mexican sovereignty is well worth the gains to Mexican workers’ rights and their
quality of living.
In any case, U.S. manufacturers will have to review their operation
networks and supply chains to comply with the new labor laws. Any
U.S. investigation into labor violations could have immediate impacts
on their supply chains and jeopardize the cross-border transfer of
their goods. Although this will inevitably lead to greater costs for
these corporations, the effect of implementing labor reforms will improve the state of not only Mexican workers, but U.S. workers who
should benefit from a boost in domestic jobs and manufacturing.
Many have expressed concern that when faced with these increased
costs, companies will simply shift the costs to consumers, making auto-

112. Id.
113. Swanson, supra note 101.
114. Id.
115. JOEBIDEN.COM, The Biden Plan for Strengthening Worker Organizing, Collective Bargaining, and Unions, https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
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mobiles more expensive.116 Alternatively, manufacturers may elect to
pay the 2.5 percent standard tariff rather than accommodate higher
wages in Mexico in order to qualify for the preferred tariff rate.117
Thus, it may be necessary to raise the standard tariff to a level that
eliminates the benefit of disregarding labor requirements and incentivizes manufacturers to advance labor reforms. These labor reforms
are truly unprecedented in scope and must be aggressively pursued
under the leadership of the new Biden administration. If the labor
reforms fail, it will not only condemn Mexican workers to further oppression, but will also result in U.S. manufacturers maintaining
largely outsourced production operations.
B. Energy & Environmental Protections
Chapter 24 of the USMCA contains “broad, boilerplate language
on the protection of air and water quality,” mandating that the signatory countries “agree to promote corporate social responsibility, as
well as utilize voluntary mechanisms” to protect the environment and
address the spread of invasive species.118 Although dedicating a full
chapter to environmental issues is an upgrade from the mere side letter status afforded to environmental commitments under NAFTA, the
commitments are seen by most as having no meaningful legal effect.119
However, although many have criticized the USMCA’s lack of environmental protections, the Agreement may actually be the key mediator for transitioning the continent to renewable energy. For example,
the USMCA has wide implications on the Mexican energy industry
and U.S. efforts to aid in the country’s transition to renewable energy
sources. Chapter 8 of the USMCA spells out Mexico’s ownership of
oil and gas, recognizing that Mexico has “sovereign right[s] to reform
its constitution and its domestic legislation . . . . without prejudice to
their rights and remedies” under the Agreement.120 However, the
USMCA obligates Mexico to respect private sector energy investments, limiting newly elected President Manuel Lopez Obrador’s ability to honor his commitment to bolster state-owned energy fossil fuel
firms like Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and The Comisión Federal
116. Ashlie Lopez, How USMCA Will Affect Auto Industry, WARDSAUTO (June 25, 2020),
https://www.wardsauto.com/industry-voices/how-usmca-will-affect-auto-industry (“Higher material and labor costs will ultimately increase retail prices . . . .”).
117. Aschcoff, supra note 91.
118. U.S.M.C.A. ch. 24; WHITING & BEAUMONT-SMITH, supra note 2, at 6.
119. See WHITING & BEAUMONT-SMITH, supra note 2.
120. U.S.M.C.A. ch. 8.; Dave Graham, UPDATE 2- Mexico Defends State-Led Energy Policy
as Investors Look to Biden, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-bidenmexico-idCNL1N2JW1LY.
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de Electicidad (CFE) at the expense of private renewable energy
providers.121 President Obrador is currently attempting to overturn a
constitutional reform that opened up the Mexican energy market to
foreign investors.122 He has “threatened to overturn a 2013-14 constitutional overhaul” by the previous government that allowed for the
opening of the energy sector to private capital.123 Many renewable
energy providers have taken the Mexican government to court over
efforts to sideline these investments in favor of traditional stateowned fossil fuel.124 More than twenty companies have filed injunctions against Mexico, arguing that the law may violate Mexico’s commitments under the USMCA.125
Further, observers have also complained that these efforts are undermining the goals of the USMCA.126 “There can’t, for practical purposes, be a change in the [Mexican] constitution that would reverse
. . . the opening [of Mexico’s energy market] without violating the
USMCA.”127 Thus, many industry groups active in renewable energy
investment are pressuring the Biden administration to aggressively defend corporate interests under the Agreement, especially since the
Trump administration did little to pressure compliance.128
The USMCA may be effective in deterring Mexico from blocking
foreign renewable energy investment. If Mexico does choose to
breach the USMCA, “it could face heavy penalties, such as costly arbitration settlements or [trade] restrictions” with USMCA members.129 This would be a costly gamble for President Obrador, as the
United States alone accounts for about eighty percent of Mexican exports.130 This may be the reason that President Obrador has scaled
back much of his rhetoric about the energy sector. After initially casting energy reformers as corrupt politicians influenced by private com121. Graham, supra note 120.
122. Dave Graham, Analysis: Mexican President’s Energy Reform Threat Faces U.S. Reality
Check, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-usa-energy/analysismexican-presidents-energy-reform-threat-faces-u-s-reality-check-idUSKBN29O2BK
123. Id.
124. Graham, supra note 120.
125. John F. Walsh et al., United States: Three Tips For Investors in Mexico’s Energy Sector
Regarding Potential USMCA Claims, WILMERHALE (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.mondaq.com/
unitedstates/oil-gas-electricity/1049450/three-tips-for-investors-in-mexico39s-energy-sector-regarding-potential-usmca-claims-.
126. Id.
127. Graham, supra note 122.
128. Graham, supra note 120.
129. Id.
130. CANDRIAM, Mexico: Economy Highly Dependent on the United States (July 2, 2019),
https://www.candriam.com/en/professional/market-insights/topics/macro/mexico-economy-highly
-dependent-on-the-united-states/.
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panies, he has recently embraced the USMCA as vital to reviving
Mexico’s post-coronavirus economy and even walked back on talks of
eliminating Mexico’s telecom regulator after the country’s economic
minister advised him that doing so would violate the USMCA. 131
Obrador is now committed to not doing “‘anything that breaches the
law.’”132
Regardless, President Obrador has reiterated his commitment to
defend Mexico’s strategic economic interests.133 Other officials have
also indicated the energy reforms “would not be canceled,” but would
be pursued through channels of international negotiation.134
Understandably, U.S. investors are wary of the status of their billions of dollars’ worth of energy investment in the country. As the
Biden administration is expected to adopt a more rules-based approach to government than the Trump administration, and is seen as a
champion to renewable power, the USMCA is set to become a powerful tool to hold Mexico to its commitment to opening its energy sector
to foreign investment and ultimately transition the country to renewable energy sources. Whether he will go through with the reforms,
President Obrador’s policies are delaying, frustrating, and discouraging private investment in Mexico’s energy sector. The commitment the
Biden administration demonstrates to enforcing the USMCA will inevitably play a major role in increasing investor confidence in Mexico’s private energy market. If the Biden administration is to avoid
regulatory paralysis, it will have to come out in full force regarding its
commitment to holding Mexico to its agreed upon obligations to ensure continued renewable investment in the region.
IV. IMPACT
As NAFTA had many unintended consequences, so too will the
USMCA. Although many of these consequences will take years to
come to light, some are now becoming apparent. However, perhaps
these consequences do not have to be so dim.
For example, the USMCA’s labor provisions may lead to further
unintended benefits for Mexican migrant workers. These labor provisions include health protections for migrants regardless of immigra131.
132.
133.
134.

Graham, supra note 122.
Id.
Graham, supra note 120.
Graham, supra note 122.
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tion status.135 Article 23.3, point 2 states that “[e]ach party shall adopt
and maintain statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder, governing acceptable conditions of . . . occupational safety and health,”
and Article 23.8 notes that all parties “must ensure migrant workers
are protected under labor laws” whether they are citizens or not.136
Mexico has indicated that it will invoke these labor provisions to ensure that illegal migrants in the United States receive coronavirus vaccines and announced that they will consider any exclusion of migrant
workers as a violation of the Agreement.137 Although they are relatively vague provisions and are unlikely to obligate the United States
to vaccinate migrant workers, the Mexican government could use its
power to deny Mexican nationals the right to migrate to the United
States for work as leverage to enforce its demands. NAFTA made
many U.S. industries dependent on Mexican labor, giving Mexico a
powerful tool in its trade arsenal.138 The Biden administration will almost certainly be more receptive to this idea than the previous administration, and if it is to maintain its commitment to increasing the
standard of living of workers, then it ought to consider it.
Additionally, where the Biden administration may represent the
greatest change to U.S. trade policy is with the environment. Perhaps
the greatest environmental challenge to the Biden administration will
be climate change, which has never been a major feature of any U.S.
trade agreement.139 However, that may be set to change, as President
Biden has called for the conditioning of future trade agreements on
the ability of trade partners to meet climate targets under the Paris
Climate Agreement, which President Biden recently rejoined as one
of the first acts of his presidency.140
Additionally, President Biden immediately revoked the permit
needed to build the $9 billion Keystone XL oil pipeline running from
Canada to Texas.141 Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who
135. Matt Rivers, Can Mexico Force the US to Vaccinate Migrant Workers Against Covid-19?,
CNN (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/15/americas/mexico-us-workers-vaccinationusmca/index.html.
136. U.S.M.C.A. arts. 23.3.2, 23.8.
137. Id.
138. CONGRESS. RES. SERV., U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS: TRENDS, ISSUES, AND IMPLICATIONS 6
(June 25, 2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32934 (“U.S. manufacturing
industries, including automotive, electronics, appliances, and machinery, all rely on the assistance of Mexican manufacturers.”).
139. Alexandra Ellerbeck, The Energy 202: Advocates Want Biden to Use Trade Deals to
Combat Climate Change, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2021/01/20/energy-202-advocates-want-biden-use-trade-deals-combat-climate-change/.
140. Id.
141. Taube, supra note 68.
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“‘welcome[d] the president’s commitment to fight climate change,’”
was “‘disappointed’” in President Biden’s decision to revoke the permit.142 This most recent revocation is the third time a U.S. president
has blocked the pipeline, which requires a presidential permit to cross
the U.S.-Canadian border.143
Although the USMCA may provide some remedies to aggrieved industries that have been affected by Biden’s recent executive orders, it
is unlikely that those companies will be able to secure any significant
legal remedy under the Agreement. For example, there are murmurs
that the owners of the Keystone XL pipeline may seek a remedy
against the United States through the USMCA.144 TC Energy and the
Government of Alberta, which both have ownership stakes in the
pipeline, may file a lawsuit over breach of contract and lost revenue
from the pipeline.145Alberta Premier, Jason Kenny, recently stated
that his government “would file lawsuits seeking damages from the
United States for canceling the pipeline.”146
The Alberta government has the option of filling a Chapter 11 case
against the United States.147 “A Chapter 11 complaint allows companies to challenge decisions by states and the provision to do so has
been grandfathered” into the USMCA, from the old NAFTA agreement.”148 The government has until 2023 to file a complaint.149 TC
Energy or the Government of Alberta will need to make the case that
the revocation was arbitrary and a denial of due process, which many
see as exceedingly challenging.150 In fact, TC Energy tried a Chapter
11 challenge in 2016 when the pipeline was canceled by the Obama
administration, but the suit was ultimately dropped when President
Trump granted the permit.151 Although the pipeline owners may decide to re-file these suits, the odds are against them as the United
States has never lost a Chapter 11 case and paid damages.152 Additionally, the language contained in the presidential permit specifically
states that “Keystone’s ‘permit may be terminated, revoked, or
142. Id.
143. Geoffrey Morgan, TC Energy and Alberta Face Long Odds if They Sue U.S. Government
Over Cancelled Keystone XL, FIN. POST (Jan. 20, 2021), https://financialpost.com/commodities/
tc-energy-and-alberta-face-long-odds-if-they-sue-u-s-government-over-cancelled-keystone-xl.
144. Id.
145. Taube, supra note 68.
146. Morgan, supra note 143.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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amended at any time at the sole discretion of the President.’”153 Thus,
although the USMCA may be criticized as providing a means to challenge needed environmental actions, the fact of the matter is that it
offers little hope under its Chapter 11 provisions of providing any real
remedy.
V. CONCLUSION
Although NAFTA was initially hailed as a massive victory for proponents of free trade and globalization, the agreement had devastating unintended economic consequences throughout North America
and ignored many of the realities of climate change and environmental regulation. The USMCA aims to modernize NAFTA, creating a
modern trade framework reflective of twenty-first century economic
realities. Early signs are pointing to the Agreement being a success.
The acquisition of Kansas City Southern Railroad by Canadian Pacific
Railway Ltd. (CP) for USD $29 billion is a sign that private enterprise
expects trade between the three nations to increase from the deal.154
Additionally, the Independent International Trade Commission predicted the USMCA would create 176,000 new jobs, increase U.S. exports in the trade bloc by $33 billion, and add over $68.2 billion to the
U.S. economy – all while modernizing Mexican labor practices.155
However, the reality is that these goals will not be obtained unless the
Biden administration seriously commits itself to enforcing the Agreement and providing the necessary funding for implementing its
reforms.156
In the hands of a new administration, the USMCA is a powerful
tool that can be used to transition North America to renewable energies instrumental in the fight against climate change. Its labor reforms
offer hope of not only improving conditions for Mexican workers, but
also that of the American middle class. Unlike NAFTA, the USMCA
is malleable to change. Article 34.7 details a review and termination
process requiring review every six years to ensure it never becomes
outdated.157 It is an extraordinary tool if used to its full extent and
153. Id.
154. RAILWAY AGE, Canadian Pacific, Kansas City Southern Will Merge into “The First
USMCA Railroad,” CPKC (UPDATED) (Mar. 21, 2021), https://www.railwayage.com/freight/
class-i/canadian-pacific-kansas-city-southern-will-merge-into-the-first-usmca-railroad-cpkc/ (The
deal will create the first “USMCA railroad,” linking the United States, Canada, and Mexico.).
155. Steve Bulger, US-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement Crucial to Small Business in NY,
SYRACUSE.COM (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.syracuse.com/opinion/2019/10/us-mexico-canadatrade-agreement-crucial-to-small-business-in-ny-commentary.html.
156. Id.
157. WHITING & BEAUMONT-SMITH, supra note 2.
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represents an opportunity to usher in a new era of North American
cooperation for the benefit of the citizenry of the entire trade bloc. It
can truly be a “gold standard for trade agreements,” and become the
building block for U.S. trade policy for years to come.158
David Evans

158. Morgan, supra note 143.

